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The Case for Replacement Migration 
 
“New Germans? We make 
them ourselves.”1 
 
Population ageing is a global phenomenon. In almost all states of the world, the proportion 
of older persons is increasing.2 This process, which is expected to accelerate in the coming 
decades, alters the balance between the aggregate capacities and needs of a population, 
and is captured, albeit crudely, by the so-called “age dependency ratio” – i.e. the ratio of 
persons aged 65 or above to persons aged 20-64. As this ratio increases, transfer programs 
between age groups – programs that transfer resources from persons of working age to the 
elderly, such as public pensions, health care and long-term care - become unsustainable 
without reform. 
 This article examines the nature of the demographic policies developed states 
should pursue in response to population ageing.3 Demographic policies aim to affect the 
size or composition of a population. More specifically, I will examine the relative 
emphasis developed states should place on two types of demographic policy that aim at 
increasing the proportion of working-age persons in their populations: pronatalism, which 
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aims to increase the fertility rate of the population, and replacement migration, which 
aims to increase its immigration rate. Neither of these demographic policies, nor some 
combination of them, can realistically “solve” the problem of population ageing over time, 
at least if by that we mean rendering existing inter-age group transfer programs 
permanently sustainable.4 But they can form part of the overall adjustment developed 
states should make to population ageing. 
This article defends the conclusion that developed states have a conditional duty to 
prioritise replacement migration over pronatalism.5 This is a conditional duty in the sense 
that it holds only if states decide to pursue a demographic response to population ageing. I 
do not assume that states must adopt a demographic response to ageing – it may well be 
permissible for them to adopt a purely non-demographic response. My main claim is that 
if they do adopt a demographic response, then they must adopt replacement migration 
rather than pronatalism as their preferred demographic response.  
Section 1 provides background information about the demographic transition that 
is taking place in developed states, and defines “pronatalism” and “replacement 
migration”. Section 2 answers the objection that an ethical comparison of different 
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demographic policies is misplaced since developed states should abstain from 
demographic policies altogether. Section 3 shows how the duty to select replacement 
migration instead of pronatalism as the preferred demographic policy follows from what I 
call the beneficence claim. This is the claim that states have duties not to deprive 
significantly worse off non-members of important benefits if they, or other groups they 
would thereby affect, would incur no non-negligible cost in their doing so. In particular, I 
show that were states to adopt pronatalism ahead of replacement migration, they would 
deprive would-be immigrants of significant opportunities to improve their quality of life 
while replacement migration would have only a negligible cost on their population and 
other affected groups (in particular, the population in the would-be immigrants’ home 
states, and future people). Section 4 responds to the objection that the value of national 
culture overrides the conditional duty to adopt replacement migration.  
 
1. The Demographic Transition, Pronatalism and Replacement Migration  
The ageing of populations in almost all parts of the world is driven by the same two-step 
process known as the “demographic transition”: declining mortality rates followed by 
declining fertility rates. Sustained mortality-decline first began in populations in northwest 
Europe around 1800, where successful public health measures (e.g. the smallpox vaccine 
of the late 1700s) began taking effect. By the late 1800s, these populations also began 
seeing a decline in their fertility rates. This demographic transition is currently underway, 
at different stages of advance, in virtually all populations of the world.6 
Depending on where exactly a given population finds itself in the demographic 
transition, its age-structure will be affected in different ways. At the initial stage of 
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demographic transition, when there is mortality decline, but as yet no fertility decline, 
there is a relative increase in the number of surviving children in a given population 
(because mortality declines most at the youngest ages). Once fertility rates also begin to 
decline, the age groups that grow the fastest, to begin with, are the working age-groups. 
This second phase has thus been called the “demographic dividend”. In a third phase, once 
both mortality and fertility rates have been declining for a significant period, the 
proportion of elderly persons begins to rise. Developed states are currently in the third 
phase of democratic transition. In the European Union between 1965 and 2015, the ratio 
of persons aged above 65 and over, to persons aged between 20-64, increased from an 
average of 15% to 29%. The 2015 figures for the United States and Canada are 22% and 
24%, respectively, while, in Japan, the 2015 ratio stood at 43%.7 
Broadly speaking, states can pursue two kinds of policies in order to adjust to the 
growing needs of their ageing populations. Non-demographic policies adapt a given 
population to its increasing age dependency ratio without altering the proportions of its 
different age groups. For example, states have sought to raise the retirement age in order 
to simultaneously increase the amount of work and decrease the amount of retirement in 
the economy.8 Alternatively, states can pursue demographic policies, which aim to alter 
the age-structure of the population. I will compare two demographic policies:  
(i) Pronatalist policies. The pronatalist policies I consider are restricted to policies 
that encourage people to have more children, in particular through economic incentives 
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(e.g. child allowances) and information campaigns that promote parenthood. Examples of 
such policies range from the historically influential 1939 Code de la Famille in France, 
which offered payments to families with a third child,9 to more colourful, present-day 
policies such as the annual “Day of Conception”, a public holiday on September 12 in the 
Russian city, Ulyanovsk, during which couples can attempt to win a prize by giving birth 
to a child exactly nine months hence.10 I leave aside pronatalist policies that violate basic 
rights, such as, arguably, policies that criminalise abortion (e.g., under the Ceausecu 
regime in Romania between 1967-1989). 
(ii) Replacement migration. The term “replacement migration” was first coined in 
a report issued by the UN in 2001.11 Its meaning is open-ended because there is more than 
one way we can construe the relevant deficit that replacement immigration is meant to 
replace. The UN report estimated the amounts of net migration that a group of low-fertility 
developed states would need during the period to 2050 in order to make up for several 
kinds of deficits. One deficit it considered was in a state’s population size relative to some 
stipulated size. Another deficit it considered, which is more relevant for our discussion, is 
in a state’s potential support ratio relative to its 1995 potential support ratio (the potential 
support ratio is the inverse ratio to the age dependency ratio). The number of net 
immigrants that low fertility states need in order to keep their potential support ratios at 
their 1995 levels is extremely large. Germany, for example, would need approximately 
188 million net migrants in the period to 2050 - on average, 3.5 million net migrants per 
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year. The UN report estimates that Germany’s population size in 2050 would have to 
reach an astronomical 299 million people if it is to keep its 1995 potential support ratio 
constant.12 The general lesson in these numbers, as demographers have known for some 
time, is that the only way replacement migration (or any demographic policy) can keep the 
potential support ratio constant during the third phase of demographic transition is by 
growing the population size unsustainably. Clearly, demographic policy – be it 
replacement migration or pronatalism - cannot render population ageing economically 
sustainable on its own.13 
This article construes replacement migration policy as any policy that aims to 
increase the net immigration rate of working-age members of the population. Two more 
specific points should be noted about the notion of a “replacement migration” policy. 
First, I assume that replacement migration policies aim to admit working-age foreigners 
who are not asylum-seekers or refugees. Replacement migration policies consist, for 
example, of policies that reduce the number of points necessary for entry (assuming a 
points-based immigration system) or relaxing the constraints on employers to hire foreign 
workers (assuming an employer-based immigration system). I make this assumption 
because I want to examine whether states must give priority to replacement migration over 
pronatalism even when the would-be immigrants do not need safe harbour from human 
rights violations they would suffer in their home states.14 Secondly, replacement migration 
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policies can differ from each other in terms of their specific provisions. The skills that 
immigrants must have in order to gain entry, their age, and their right to bring relatives 
with them to the host state, are the three most salient provisions (given the aim of 
rendering population ageing economically sustainable).15 My central claim in this article is 
not that developed states are morally obliged to give priority to every possible replacement 
migration policy ̉over pronatalism, but to some forms of replacement migration policy (I 
say which below). 
 
2. Why Demographic Policy At All?  
Before defending the priority of replacement migration, I first consider the preliminary 
objection that an assessment of demographic responses to populating ageing is misplaced. 
This objection appeals to environmental considerations and proceeds in two steps. First, 
any demographic policy of a developed state has the effect of increasing its population 
size and therefore also its overall carbon emissions.16 This exacerbates the risk of climate 
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not suffer human rights violations in their home state, and, in contrast to the beneficence 
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change that will either set back the interests of future people, or increase the need for other 
policies that reduce emissions or ameliorate their environmental impact. Secondly, the 
ageing-induced problem of unsustainable inter-age group transfer programs can, in any 
case, be addressed if developed states focus their attention on non-demographic policies, 
such as raising the retirement age. Demographic policies are therefore unnecessary, and 
hence unjustified, given their higher carbon footprint.17  
The environmental case against demographic policy is not a conclusive basis for us 
to abstain from considering whether one demographic policy should be prioritised over 
another. There are a number of reasons for this. First, relying exclusively on a non-
demographic policy response to population ageing isn’t cost-free for current generations. 
Crudely put, if demographic policy isn’t used to add extra workers to the workforce, then 
either existing workers will have to do more work, or existing elderly recipients of their 
contributions will have to make do with fewer contributions (raising the retirement age 
does a bit of both). Secondly, it needs to be remembered that all developed states – bar 
Israel, Mexico and Turkey – are currently experiencing below-replacement fertility rates.18 
So our context is one in which demographic policy will not necessarily increase 
population size in developed states but only prevent it from declining at a faster rate than 
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otherwise. Thirdly, current generations in developed states may be able to pursue other 
policies that help to offset the environmental impact of a demographic policy– e.g. by 
investing in green technology and by increasing their support for the pursuit of a 
sustainable development goals that will reduce the fertility rate in developing states (e.g. 
the universal provision of primary and secondary education, and family planning 
services).19 Finally, it may be useful to know how states must prioritize between a set of 
policy responses to a given problem other than the policy that is best from a normative 
point of view. This is because states sometimes prefer not to do what is best from a 
normative point of view. Thus, even if, states should ideally abstain from demographic 
policy altogether, we may still need to know whether we should recommend their giving 
priority to pronatalism or replacement migration as their preferred demographic response 
to ageing. 
 
3. Four Perspectives on Replacement Migration 
My case for the priority of replacement migration focuses on the relative impact of 
replacement migration and pronatalism on four affected groups: (a) The host state – i.e. 
the state that is considering whether to adopt a replacement migration policy, (b) would-be 
immigrants – i.e. the persons who would emigrate to the host state if it adopted a 
replacement migration policy, (c) the home state – i.e. the state from which the would-be 
immigrants would emigrate, and (d) future people - people who will exist in the future (in 
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the host state, the home state and other states).20 I will argue that were developed states to 
prioritise replacement migration ahead of pronatalism, would-be immigrants would stand 
to benefit to a significant degree, while the other three groups would incur no negligible 
costs. Thus, if we endorse the beneficence claim – i.e. that a state has a duty to adopt 
policies that provide significantly worse off non-members with important benefits if its 
current population, or other potentially affected groups, would incur no non-negligible 
costs as a result – we must conclude that states have a duty to prioritise replacement 
migration ahead of pronatalism as their preferred form of demographic response to ageing. 
 A key strength of this case for replacement migration is that the beneficence claim 
can be upheld from within two foundational approaches to normative theorising: a 
contractualist approach and an aggregative approach (that emphasises one or another 
social welfare function, e.g. utilitarianism or prioritarianism). Very roughly, 
contractualism tells us to compare individual objections to the policies under 
consideration and to reject the policy that faces the strongest individual objection.21 
Aggregative approaches tell us to reject the policy that promotes the smallest sum, or 
                                                        
20
 I assume that the policy choice will not affect other groups of persons to a degree that is 
sufficiently significant to justify altering the conclusion we would reach were we to 
consider its impact only on groups (a)-(d). 
21
 On contractualism, see T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2000); and for an application of contractualism to global justice, 
see Pablo Gilabert, From Global Poverty to Global Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), especially Ch. 2.  
 11 
weighted sum, of welfare (according to one or another social welfare function).22 Both 
foundational approaches converge on the beneficence claim (it is true both that the failure 
to comply with the beneficence claim would raise the strongest individual objection and 
that complying with the beneficence claim would produce the greatest sum of welfare). 
Thus, assuming that the beneficence claim entails that developed states must give priority 
to replacement migration, proponents of either foundational approach to normative 
theorising should endorse a duty to prioritise replacement migration.23 
One possible concern with appealing to the beneficence claim in order to justify a 
duty to prioritise replacement migration, is that while beneficence is often invoked in 
discussions of the duties of individuals, it is not often invoked in discussions of the duties 
of states.24 However, we can plausibly construe the beneficence claim as it applies to a 
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state as nothing other than a set of beneficence claims that apply to its individual 
members. To assert a beneficence claim about a state is, in other words, to assert that there 
exists a set of beneficence claims that apply to its individual members that generate duties 
for them to combine their actions with each other in order to collectively benefit non-
members, assuming that their so combining their actions is relatively costless for them.   
 (i) Would-be immigrants. We can begin by briefly noting the relatively 
straightforward point that replacement migration would be preferable to pronatalist policy 
from the perspective of would-be immigrants under virtually all realistic circumstances. 
Replacement migration provides would-be immigrants with a valuable opportunity to 
emigrate in search of a better life. There may be extreme forms of replacement migration 
in which immigrants would be deprived of basic rights in their host states, but this is not 
an unavoidable feature of a replacement migration policy, and it is difficult to believe that 
this would actually be a feature of replacement migration in most developed states. 
(ii) Future people. In determining how we should take the interests of future 
people into account in our evaluation of pronatalism and replacement migration, we 
encounter two deep questions in population ethics. The first question is about the 
relevance of the fact that the future people that would exist under prontalism are not the 
same as the future people that would exist under replacement migration. Does this fact of 
non-identity between the future people that would exist under either policy imply that we 
may disregard the interests of future people from our evaluation of the two policies? This 
implication may seem to follow from this fact: it would be true of whichever policy we 
chose that the future people that would exist under it could not have been made better off 
had we chosen the other policy instead.25 The second question is whether our comparison 
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of pronatalism and replacement migration should take into account the fact that one policy 
might bring more people into existence with lives worth living than the other policy. This 
second question asks about the relevance of these extra potential people to our policy 
choices. Should the interests of extra potential people matter in our evaluation of policies?  
The case I will make for replacement migration is robust with respect to how we 
answer the first question about non-identity. To see this, suppose, on the one hand, that we 
accept that the non-identity of the future people that would exist under pronatalism and 
replacement migration implies that we may disregard their interests. In that case, we 
should evaluate pronatalism versus replacement migration only by comparing the three 
other perspectives I have distinguished, and, as I show below, the beneficence claim tells 
in favour of replacement migration when we compare only those three perspectives. 
Suppose, on the other hand, we deny that non-identity implies that we may disregard the 
interests of future people. In that case, we should reach the same conclusion, because, as I 
will argue below, it is unlikely that replacement migration will be worse for future people 
than pronatalism. 
My case for replacement migration is not robust, however, with respect to how we 
answer the second question about potential people. It is likely that pronatalism will bring 
more people into existence than replacement migration. So, if we had to take into account 
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the interests that potential people have in coming into existence, the case for replacement 
migration would be weakened. The case for replacement migration may thus need to 
assume that we do not have reason to bring potential people (with lives worth living) into 
existence. This assumption is not without difficulties and has been the subject of much 
controversy within population ethics.26 It should be noted, however, that the assumption 
that we do not have reason to bring potential people into existence aligns with common-
sense: most people do not believe that we owe existence to potential people, or that we 
have impersonal reasons to bring further potential people into existence beyond those that 
would, in any case, come into existence (at least if a large enough future population is 
already secured).  
We can now proceed to distinguish between two main pathways through which the 
policy choice between replacement migration and pronatalism will affect the interests of 
future people. The first is via its economic impact, the second is via its environmental 
impact. Let me explain how I will discuss each kind of impact.  
When it comes to the economic impact of both types of demographic policy on 
future people, I will make the following simplifying assumption. If replacement migration 
has better economic consequences than pronatalist policy for currently alive people, I 
assume it will have at least no worse economic consequences than pronatalist policies for 
future people with one exception. This exception is the case in which replacement 
migration achieves its better economic consequences for currently alive people by using 
up resources that would otherwise have been available to future people For example, if 
currently alive people in the host state obtain their greater economic gains from 
replacement migration through extensive public borrowing (say, in order to fund the 
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integration of immigrants) then we cannot confidently say that the good economic 
consequences replacement migration has for currently alive people translates into good 
economic consequences for future people in the host state. This simplifying assumption 
makes our discussion of the economic impact of the choice between replacement 
migration and pronatalism on future people easier, because it allows us to determine that 
impact only by looking at its impact on the current alive people in the host state. Since I 
will discuss the economic impact of the two demographic policies on the currently alive 
people in the host state in sub-section (iii) below, I will postpone a conclusion about its 
economic impact on future people for now and return to this in the concluding paragraph 
of this section.  
For the moment, we can proceed to compare the environmental impact of the 
choice between replacement migration and pronatalism on future people. Here it is helpful 
to observe that while both policies add persons to the working-age populations of the host 
state, replacement migration, unlike pronatalism, simultaneously subtracts those persons 
from the working-age populations of the home states they leave behind. For every 
working-age person added by a pronatalist policy, the increase in carbon emissions 
(relative to no demographic policy) is (a) the emissions produced by an average-length life 
lived in a developed state. By contrast, for every working-age person added by a 
replacement migration policy, the equivalent increase in emissions is (b) the emissions 
produced by an adult-portion of an average-length life in the host state minus the 
emissions of an adult-portion of an average-length life in the state the immigrant leaves 
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behind. Given that (b) is almost always lower than (a), we have good reason to believe 
that replacement migration has better environmental consequences than pronatalism.27  
One complication for this conclusion arises from the fact that immigrants tend to 
have higher fertility rates than native-born adults.28 This means that the number of second 
generation persons added by a replacement migration policy is likely to be higher than the 
number of second generation persons added by a pronatalism policy, at least if we assume 
that both policies introduce the same number of first generation adults, and this could 
mean that replacement migration will produce higher emissions than pronatalism in the 
long run.  
Note, however, that the number of first generation persons added by a replacement 
migration policy can be adjusted downwards in light of the higher average fertility rates of 
immigrants, so that the total increase in population over two generations (and 
subsequently) that is caused by replacement migration is equivalent to the same increase 
that would be caused by pronatalist policy. Of course, this downwards adjustment will 
mean that replacement migration does not have as significant an initial impact as 
pronatalism would have on altering the relative sizes of the age groups in the host state. 
But replacement migration will eventually make up for that due to the higher average 
fertility rates of immigrants and the subsequently larger group of second generation 
persons it adds. The point is illustrated in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Pronatalism and replacement migration over two generations 
1st Gen Fertility Rate 2nd Gen Total 
Pronatalism 200 1.8 360 560 
Repl. Migration 160 2.5 400 560 
 
If a pronatalism were to introduce 200 persons and a replacement migration 160 persons, 
and we assume average fertility rates of 1.8 and 2.5, respectively for each group, the 
number of persons each policy contributes over two generations is the same (560). But 
replacement migration will have a smaller environmental impact given that many of the 
160 persons it adds in its first generation will have lived the first portions of their lives in 
lower-emitting, developing states.  
Two further points diminish the environmental concerns we should have about 
replacement migration relative to pronatalism. First, we should not assume that the 
difference in average fertility rates between immigrants and native-born adults is fixed 
across all background social policies adopted in the host state. It is feasible for the host 
state to adopt background policies that help immigrants adapt to local norms and this may 
have the effect of decreasing the difference between their fertility rates and those of 
native-born adults. Secondly, replacement migration may reduce the number of children 
that immigrants have in comparison to the number they would have had had they 
remained in their home states.  
In sum, there are significant immediate savings in emissions if a person is added to 
the population of developed states via immigration rather than by his being brought into 
existence via a pronatalism policy. There are also, to be sure, eventual costs in emissions 
to the extent that persons added via immigration may increase the average fertility rate in 
that society, but these can be avoided if the replacement migration policy adjusts the 
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number of persons it introduces downwards. These considerations make it reasonable to 
conclude that the environmental impact of replacement migration on future people may 
not be worse than the environmental impact of pronatalism in a significant range of cases. 
Assuming the same about the economic impact of that policy choice on future people (a 
point I make at the end of this section), we should conclude that future people would have 
no significant objections to the priority of replacement migration over pronatalism. 
(iii) The population of the host state. When comparing the economic impact of 
replacement migration and pronatalism on the current population of the host state, we face 
the theoretical problem that the economic effects of these two policies depend on how 
they interact with other economic policies – in particular, with background fiscal policies 
that tax and redistribute income and wealth. We must decide whether we should compare 
the economic effects that the two demographic policies would have on the assumption that 
they would be interacting with the fiscal policies that are currently in force or with 
alternative fiscal policies that could be in force. Consider, for example, the controversy 
over the effects of pro-immigration policy on low-wage native workers.29 If one analyses 
those effects on the assumption that background fiscal policies remain as they are, and 
those fiscal policies do not significantly redistribute the aggregate benefits that a pro-
immigration policy brings to the economy, the conclusion may well be that a pro-
immigration policy would have negative effects on low-wage workers. But if one asks 
what the effects of a pro-immigration policy would be under alternative fiscal policies that 
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redistributed its aggregate benefits, the answer may be that it would have positive effects 
on low-wage workers (assuming these workers gain from the redistribution of those 
aggregate benefits). 
Whether we should compare demographic policies as they interact with the fiscal 
policies that are currently in force or with those that could be in force depends on the 
underlying aim of our inquiry. My aim is to identify the demographic policy that belongs 
to the most defensible total set of feasible policies.30 Given this aim, we must compare 
how replacement migration and pronatalism interact with fiscal policies that could be in 
place. We can do this by asking how these policies differ in terms of the fiscally 
redistributable economic gains they produce for the host population (i.e. gains that can be 
redistributed, via feasible fiscal policies, across different social positions within the 
population). If replacement migration produces a no smaller amount of fiscally 
redistributable economic gains than pronatalism, I assume the host population can have no 
significant objection to it, so far as its economic effects are concerned.  
This comparison of fiscal impact turns largely on two key issues: (a) the difference 
between the costs that the host population must undertake in order to acquire the added 
                                                        
30
 To be clear, I do not believe that the different aim of identifying what would be the 
most defensible demographic policy given current, and possibly unjust, fiscal policies, is 
without value. Knowing this is valuable for actors who are unable to alter the fiscal 
policies of their state in a more just direction (e.g. members of a temporary minority who 
favour just fiscal policies). My reason for identifying the demographic policy that belongs 
to the most defensible total set of feasible policies is that I believe citizens in developed 
states are not permanently disabled from bringing about the most defensible combination 
of demographic and fiscal policies, and can therefore benefit from knowing what that 
combination is. 
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human capital of a worker introduced by replacement migration versus pronatalism, and 
(b) the difference in the value of the human capital added by either policy. Let us consider 
(a) and (b) first in a deliberately simple manner, before complicating our analysis.31  
Call an average adult added to the working-age population by pronatalism, Nora, 
and an average adult added by replacement migration, Matilda. The host state would incur 
two costs in adding Nora that it would not incur in adding Matilda: (i) the cost of the 
incentives that the pronatalism policy would have to give Nora’s parents in order for them 
to want to have Nora and (ii) the cost of public services consumed by Nora during her 
childhood (e.g. public primary and secondary education). However, taxpayers may have to 
cover a distinctive cost with respect to Matilda, namely (iii) the cost of effectively 
integrating Matilda into the workforce, e.g. providing Matilda with language instruction 
(though the cost of effective integration will vary depending on the type of immigrant 
Matilda is). There is good reason, I assume, to believe that costs (i) and (ii), taken 
together, are higher than cost (iii), for at least some types of immigrant.32 
                                                        
31
 While there is an extensive economics literature on the net fiscal impact of immigration 
on developed states, no scholarly comparison of the fiscal impact of adding native-born 
adults via pronatalism versus replacement migration exists so far as I am aware. The 
comparison that follows is intended only as a provisional analysis. 
32
 This claim is supported by the following observation. Average annual public 
expenditure on primary and secondary education in OECD states is $9,258 and each 
native-born needs 12 years of such expenditure (a total of $111,096). Add expenditure on 
pre-school care, and healthcare, and other social policies devoted to rearing children, and 
the figure becomes higher. It is implausible that the effective integration of skilled 
immigrants into the labour market would require public expenditure anywhere near that 
amount. See OECD, Education Spending (Indicator), doi: 10.1787/ca274bac-en (accessed 
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Next, consider the value of the human capital added by Nora and Matilda. Here it 
is worth observing that a replacement migration policy can make it a condition for 
Matilda’s admission that she possesses valuable human capital, whereas no such criterion 
can be imposed on Nora (who will have a right to stay in her host state regardless). Once 
again, the difference in value between Matilda’s and Nora’s human capital will depend on 
the type of immigrant that Matilda is (replacement migration will admit more valuable 
human capital the more demanding its skills-based admissions criteria). So far, then, our 
simple comparison of the fiscal impact of Nora and Matilda supports the provisional 
conclusion that there will be a class of Matildas whose average member generates a 
greater fiscal contribution than the average Nora. 
Let us now take on board some complications. First, suppose Matilda has a higher 
fertility rate than Nora. More public expenditure will thus be needed to cover the needs of 
Matilda’s children than Nora’s children. It might be thought that this adds costs to 
admitting Matilda. Here, however, we must avoid the mistake of assessing the fiscal 
impact of Matilda’s children (and hence of admitting Matilda) by considering only public 
expenditure on their needs during their childhood. What we need to consider is the lifetime 
fiscal impact of Matilda’s children and there is no reason to assume that Matilda’s 
children won’t be net fiscal contributors over their lifetimes, or that they will contribute 
less, over their lifetimes, than Nora’s children (though, again, this will depend on the 
extent to which Matilda is highly skilled and able to help her children develop their human 
                                                                                                                                                                      
on 4 September 2017). For a review of the costs of rearing children, see Nancy Folbre, 
Valuing Children (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008). For a guide on 
assessing public expenditure on immigrants, see Solon Ardittis and Frank Laczko (eds.), 
Assessing the Costs and Impact of Migration Policy (Geneva: International Organization 
for Migration, 2008). 
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capital). While the higher fertility rates of immigrants are indeed a matter of 
environmental concern (as we saw earlier), they are not necessarily a concern from an 
economic point of view once we adopt a lifetime view of the fiscal impact of children. 
A second complication is that Nora is likely to be younger than Matilda. All Noras 
enter the working-age population at 18, whereas the age of the average Matilda is much 
higher. Nora will thus be able to contribute more years of taxation than Matilda to the 
public purse. However, we should be careful not to overstate the relevance of the age 
difference between Nora and Matilda. Nora will indeed work for a larger number of years 
than Matilda, but these will be her lowest income years (e.g. 18 to 30), and she will incur 
public expenditure during those years. Her net fiscal contribution during the period of 
adulthood that precedes Matilda’s admission may not even be positive. According to the 
Tax Foundation, the largest think-tank devoted to research on US tax policy, “households 
aged 35 to 64 pay more in taxes than they receive in government spending, while 
households under age 35 and over age 64 receive more government spending than they 
pay in taxes.”33   
A final complication is that Matilda may bring relatives with her, whereas Nora 
will not, and Matilda’s relatives may well end up constituting a relative cost in admitting 
Matilda’s human capital. How extensive this cost is depends on how many relatives 
Matilda brings with her (and hence on how strict the family unification provision of the 
replacement migration is). If Matilda may only bring a spouse, he may not prove to be a 
net fiscal cost if he is effectively integrated into the labour market. 
                                                        
33
 Andrew Chamberlain and Gerald Prante, “Generational Equity: Which Age Groups Pay 
More Tax, and Which Receive More Government Spending?” Tax Foundation Working 
Paper No. 156, (2007), p. 1. 
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Once we take on board the above complications, we need to revise our initial 
comparison of fiscal impact. While Nora’s substantial childhood costs outstrip the costs of 
Matilda’s effective integration into the labour market, admitting Matilda may generate 
costs associated with fulfilling the social rights of family relatives that she may bring with 
her. However, the following conclusion seems reasonable: some, though not necessarily 
all, versions of a replacement migration policy may end up yielding greater fiscally 
redistributable economic gains for the host state than pronatalism, namely, those versions 
that focus on admitting skilled and relatively young immigrants and that offer limited 
family unification provisions. The host state may thus be unable to raise a significant 
objection against these selective replacement migration policies (as I call will call them 
from now on). 
(iv) The immigrants’ home populations. A developed state’s demographic policy 
can also have significant effects on the populations of the immigrant’s home state, 
especially if her home state is a developing state. When skilled workers emigrate from 
developing states to develop states, their home populations are deprived of the future 
contributions they might have contributed to their economies. When replacement 
migration has this so-called “brain drain” effect, it is less preferable to pronatalism from 
the point of view of the would-be immigrant’s home population.  
However, according to recent empirical work, a significant number of developing 
states actually gain economically from skilled emigration. A key factor that explains these 
so-called “brain gain” cases is the incentive that the possibility of emigration provides for 
young adults in the developing state to invest in their human capital. Much of the 
increased stock of human capital that materializes as a result of this incentive ends up 
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remaining in the home state (not all skilled individuals emigrate). Emigration can also 
have positive indirect effects insofar as emigrants transfer knowledge back home.34 
We should thus qualify the case for replacement migration as follows. 
Replacement migration is not normatively preferable to pronatalism in brain drain cases. 
In such cases, the would-be immigrant’s home state may be able to reasonably reject a 
replacement migration policy, especially considering the fact that, qua population of a 
developing state, it is already struggling with significant economic and socio-political 
burdens. Those who remain behind in a brain drain case may have stronger objections to 
the developed state’s prioritising replacement migration than the would-be immigrants 
amongst them would have to its prioritising pronatalism. Note, however, that the case for 
                                                        
34
 The incentive effect of skilled emigration on human capital formation in some 
developing states is defended by Michel Beine, Frédéric Docquier and Hillel Rapoport 
across a number of articles. See especially, “Brain drain and human capital formation in 
developing countries: winners and losers,” The Economic Journal, 118 (2008): 631-652 
and “Brain drain and economic growth: theory and evidence,” Journal of Development 
Economics 64 (2001): 275-289. For criticisms of this empirical claim, see Gillian Brock, 
“Responsibilities In An Unjust World: A Reply to Carens, Kollar, Oberman, and 
Rapoport,” Law, Ethics and Philosophy 4 (2016): 161-182 and Devesh Kapur and John 
McHale, Give us Your Best and Brightest, (Brookings Institution Press, 2005), Ch. 5. 
While these criticisms may be forceful against the claim that the incentive effect holds in 
all cases, my case for replacement migration does not depend on its holding in all cases. I 
defend replacement migration only in the range of cases in which it has a positive effect 
on the would-be immigrants’ home states. According to Beine et. al. this is not an 
insignificant number of cases (See “Brain drain and human capital,” 644). 
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replacement migration will still hold in the range of cases in which skilled emigration 
produces a brain gain.  
 The provisional conclusion we should reach is that selective replacement migration 
policy is normatively preferable to pronatalism in brain gain cases. It would be preferable 
from the perspectives of would-be immigrants (even assuming tight family unification 
provisions), and it would not face significant objections from the perspectives of the 
current populations of the immigrants’ host and home state. Furthermore, there is no 
conclusive reason for thinking that replacement migration is worse from the perspective of 
future people, both in view of its environment impact and in view of its economic impact, 
than pronatalism. If replacement migration generates economic gains for current 
populations and has not done so by increasing public debt, we should assume that it will 
not make future generations worse off in economic terms than they would have been 
under pronatalism. 
 
4. The Cultural Prerogative  
Let me now consider an objection to the priority of replacement migration that rests on 
considerations of national culture.35 The objection begins with the claim that states, like 
                                                        
35
 I leave aside two further objections. The first objects that my case for replacement 
migration “commodifies” immigrants. It does not do that. I appeal to the valuable human 
capital of immigrants, not in order to justify the claim that the host state ought to benefit 
from them, but that it has no significant objection to admitting them. The second objection 
is moved from a global egalitarian perspective and maintains that developed states ought 
to adopt immigration policies that are more generous than selective replacement 
migration. This objection also misunderstands my defense: I am defending the priority of 
selective replacement migration over pronatalism on the non-egalitarian ground that states 
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individuals, have an agent-centred prerogative to give extra weight to their own interests 
when deciding between policies.36 It then adds that states (or their members) have an 
interest in preserving a general allegiance in their population to certain values embodied in 
their national culture. This point, if sound, would favour a prerogative to prioritise 
pronatalism on the assumption that pronatalism would do better than replacement 
migration in furnishing future co-citizens who will share an allegiance to the existing 
national culture of a population.37 
My response to this objection does not challenge its first claim. Indeed, since my 
case for replacement migration assumes that the beneficence claims can apply to states as 
a derivation of beneficence claims that apply to individuals, it must, as a matter of 
consistency, accept that prerogative claims can apply to states in the same manner. My 
response focuses, instead, on the objection’s second claim, regarding the relevance of the 
interest in preserving a general allegiance to a national culture. I will argue that we may 
not regard this interest as a relevant consideration when determining which demographic 
policy a state must adopt, and that the agent-centred prerogative therefore does not apply. 
States therefore cannot maintain that they have a prerogative to pronatalise on grounds of 
national culture. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
must undertake relatively costless beneficence. This is compatible with the view that 
states ought to adopt an immigration policy that is more generous than selective 
replacement migration on global egalitarian grounds. 
36
 The agent-centered prerogative is defended by Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of 
Consequentialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), Ch. 2. 
37
 This assumption may overstate the extent to which native-born generations (in a liberal 
society) preserve culture (witness the extent to which native-born generations overturned 
Western culture in the 1960s). 
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I begin by distinguishing two views of the value of a general allegiance to a 
national culture. The first view is that this general allegiance is of intrinsic value: it is 
valuable for its own sake that there exists a general allegiance to a particular national 
culture. The second view emphasises only the instrumental value of culture: a general 
allegiance to a national culture is valuable, on this second view, only insofar as it helps to 
secure certain further goods for a given population (e.g. it promotes social trust between 
citizens, and thereby supports the redistributive institutions of the welfare state that 
supposedly rely on a high degree of social trust).38  
Consider now the culture based prerogative as it might rest on each of these views 
in turn. The problem with the intrinsic value version of the prerogative emerges once we 
notice the following point: how exactly pronatalism and replacement migration will differ 
in terms of their impact on the preservation of a national culture is something that will 
depend on what exactly we mean by “national culture”. We can usefully distinguish 
between “thinner” and “thicker” conceptions of national culture. On a thinner conception, 
national culture consists of a small set of shared abstract beliefs amongst a particular 
population, say, about how their state’s political institutions should function – for 
example, that they should be democratic in character and that they should respect basic 
liberal rights. A thin national culture might involve the shared endorsement of a particular 
political constitution, no more than that.39 A thicker conception of national culture, by 
                                                        
38
 That shared culture promotes social trust is a claim asserted by David Miller across a  
number of articles. See, for example, “Immigrants, nations, and citizenship,” Journal 
of Political Philosophy 16 (2008), 371-390.  
39
 This is akin to the idea of “constitutional patriotism”. See Jan-Werner Müller and Kim 
Lane Scheppele, “Constitutional patriotism: an introduction,” International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 6 (2008), 67-71. 
 28 
contrast, identifies national culture as a dense web of shared specific beliefs about, for 
example, the value of a particular language, certain norms of social interaction, a 
particular set of feasts and myths that should be celebrated and re-told from one 
generation to the next, and a certain interpretation of the historical origins of the existing 
population. Clearly, the difference in impact that pronatalism and replacement migration 
will have on the preservation of a “national culture” will be much less significant if we 
have a thinner rather than thicker conception of it in mind. 
The problem with a prerogative based on the intrinsic value of culture can now be 
stated as follows. Let us grant that pronatalism has more favourable implications than 
replacement migration for the preservation of a “thick” national culture. Still, we should 
not take those implications into account in our assessment of demographic policy. There is 
strong reason for us to reject the view that the state may guide its choice of public policies 
(including its demographic policies) on the basis of one or another conception of the 
intrinsic value of a thick national culture. This is because different members of the host 
population can reasonably disagree about the kind of national culture that is intrinsically 
valuable, and there are weighty reasons to avoid establishing any particular view about 
how their disagreement should be resolved. Some may believe that other members of their 
society should share a general allegiance only to a political constitution, and indeed that it 
is to be regretted if a thicker national culture should emerge beyond that. Others may 
believe it is valuable that their society should consist of a culturally more cohesive 
population. While it is reasonable that each side in this disagreement should promote their 
own view of this matter by exercising their freedom of speech, it is not reasonable, at least 
in a liberal-democratic state, for either side to use the apparatus of the state to coercively 
promote their view (e.g. by taxing people in order to fund a pronatalist policy). This would 
be a failure to take seriously the idea that state policies – including demographic policies - 
must be justified to citizens who reasonably disagree about what makes life valuable, 
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including the kind of national culture that people should be able to participate in. Note, 
that my claim, here, is not that a pro-immigration policy, rather than an anti-immigration 
policy, should be adopted as matter of default. I am making the more limited claim that a 
certain consideration may not be appealed to by citizens when they deliberate over 
demographic policy, namely, that a particular conception of national culture should be 
coercively promoted in a context in which people reasonably disagree about the kind of 
national culture that is valuable.40 A state prerogative to pronatalise cannot therefore be 
justified by appealing to the intrinsic value of national culture. 
Consider, next, a prerogative based on the instrumental value of national culture. 
This prerogative seems more defensible because the claim that the goods of social trust 
and economic solidarity (for which it says a shared national culture is necessary) are worth 
protecting is not as controversial as the claim that a particular thick conception of national 
culture is intrinsically valuable. However, there are two problems with the instrumental 
cultural prerogative. First, it is far from clear that cultural diversity actually undermines 
social trust. Anti-immigration platforms have indeed been on the rise in many states today 
and have played significant roles, for example, in the Brexit referendum, and in recent US, 
                                                        
40
 For a defence of the idea that political institutions may not promote a particular 
conception of national culture on the ground that it is intrinsically valuable, see Ronald 
Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 212-
215. The point I am making in this paragraph can also be moved from within the political 
liberalism of John Rawls, according to which political institutions must restrict their 
policies to those that can be justified on the basis of “public reason”. Arguably, the view 
that citizens must comply with the requirements of a controversial conception of national 
culture fails that test. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia 
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Austrian, Dutch, French and German elections. But it would be a knee-jerk reaction to 
infer from these developments that cultural diversity per se undermines social trust. First, 
a broader view of the empirical evidence does not warrant such an inference. As Will 
Kymlicka writes, there are now “hundreds of studies”, and several meta-analyses of 
empirical research, that suggests that the claim that cultural diversity increases social 
distrust is inconclusive.41 Secondly, the nature of the impact that cultural diversity has on 
social trust is likely to be mediated by state policies that form the background against 
which members of a culturally diverse population interact with each other.42 For example, 
the effects of cultural diversity on social trust may vary depending on whether the state 
uses means-tested or unconditional welfare programs (means-tested welfare programs may 
reduce levels of social trust in the context of cultural diversity, because they may 
encourage the perception that recipients who belong to other cultures are “gaming” the 
system state by misreporting their economic status).43 The effects of cultural diversity on 
social trust may also be influenced by the different ways in which the state integrates 
immigrants into its native population. So, to summarise, while the intrinsic version of the 
cultural prerogative should be ruled out of bounds, the instrumental version is 
inconclusive. Neither thus stands in the way of the other considerations discussed in the 
preceding part of the article, which justify the priority for replacement migration. 
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 See Kymlicka, “Solidarity in diverse societies: beyond neoliberal multiculturalism and 
welfare chauvinism,” Comparative Migration Studies 3 (2015). 
https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-015-0017-4 
42
 For an elaboration, see Ryan Pevnick, “Social trust and the ethics of immigration 
policy, Journal of Political Philosophy 17 (2009), 146-167. 
43
 See Bo Rothstein, Just Institutions Matter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998). 
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Conclusion 
My aim has not been to determine how developed states should strike the balance between 
non-demographic and demographic policies in response to their ageing populations but the 
moral merits of two demographic policies. My conclusion is that developed states must 
prioritise selective replacement migration over pronatalism, at least in circumstances in 
which selective replacement migration produces a brain gain for developing states. This 
conclusion does not rest on the assumption that states have a duty to eliminate or reduce 
global inequality but on the more modest assumption that states ought to adopt policies 
that provide significant benefits to non-members when they (or others) would not incur 
significant costs in their doing so. This conclusion also rests on a number of provisional 
empirical claims that I have made. I have given reason for why these empirical claims are 
plausible, but they have not been tested. ̉The case for replacement migration I have made 
is thus best seen as a working hypothesis about the kind of demographic policy developed 
states ought to adopt (should they adopt a demographic policy at all), and as setting the 
direction for the empirical research we would need to pursue in order to arrive at a more 
final view of that matter. 
   
